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PHILIP M. PAYNE t
No one has the natural right to transfer property to others at his death
either by will or by intestacy. The right to take property by will or descent
is derived from and regulated by municipal law. It is a privilege, and the
authority conferring the privilege may impose conditions upon its exercise.'
In assessing a tax or excise upon such privilege, the amount thereof may be
measured by the value of the property passing.2 But such a tax is not upon
the property. The thing taxed is the transmission of property from the dead
to the living.3 Confusion of thought may arise unless it be always remem-
bered that, fundamentally considered, there are two underlying theories: viz.,
although it is and must be the property of the decedent which bears the inci-
dence 4 of the tax, the tax is not upon the property but is laid upon the
privilege of transmitting property or on the privilege of receiving property
so transmitted.'
The right to transmit and the right to receive are distinct, and each is
alike under legislative control. So distinct are these privileges that either or
both may be taxed as respects the same property.6 The one is collected on
the transfer of his estate by a decedent, and is known as an estate or transfer
t M. S., iig, LL. B., 1922, University of Virginia; contributor of articles to various
legal periodicals.
'United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628, 16 Sup. Ct. io73, 1075 (i896) ; Magoun
v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 17o U. S. 283, 288, i8 Sup. Ct. 594, 596 (1898) ; Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 753 (igoo) ; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115,
134, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, 836 (9oo) ; In re Craig's Estate, 97 App. Div. 289, 296, 89 N. Y. Supp.
97i, 975 (19o4), aff'd 18i N. Y. 551, 74 N. E. ii16 (,o95) ; People v. McCormick, 327 Ill.
547, 554, 158 N. E. 86i, 864 (1927), (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 833; Prentiss v. Eisner, 267 Fed.
i6, iS (C. C. A. 2d, i92o) ; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 329, 52 Sup. Ct.
174, 178 (1932) ; Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 6o3, 51 Sup. Ct. 306, 311 (931) ; Moody
v. Hagen, 36 N. D. 471, 484, 162 N. W. 704, 706 (917) ; Note (i918) i9i8A ANN. CAs.
939. See also Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527.
For an interesting decision denying this general theory, see Nunnemacher v. State, 129
Wis. 190, 199, 224, io8 N. W. 627, 629, 638 (i9o6) ; and Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544, 556,
121 N. W. 347, 350 (i9o9). See also Jeffries v. Alexander, 8 H. L. Cas. 594, 648 (i86o).
2 Plummer v. Coler, supra note i; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 347,
348, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 125, 126 (i929), (i929) 29 COL. L. REv. 533; May v. Heiner, 281 U. S.
238, 244, 50 Sup. Ct. 286, 287 (930); Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S.
327, 334, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, i2 (i929), (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 532; see Oppenheimer, Insmr-
ance Under the Federal Estate Tax (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 724; McCaughn v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 34 F. (2d) 443, 444 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
a Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 322, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 359 (1932) ; Cahen v. Brewster,
203 U. S. 543, 550, 27 Sup. Ct. 174, 176 (i9o6) ; Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625, 626 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1926) certiorari denied 275 U. S. 578, 48 Sup. Ct. 22 (i927).
'For a discussion of the inheritance tax from the points of view of economics and
history, see SELIGMAN, EssAYs n TAxATION (ioth ed. 1925) c. v. See Frew v. Bowers,
supra note 3, at 627.
'Coolidge v. Long, supra note i; Prentiss v. Eisner, supra note x.
8 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 141, i44, 45 Sup. Ct. 424, 425, 426 (x925).
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tax. It taxes not that to which some person succeeds upon a death, but that
which ceased by reason of death." In order that such a tax may be imposed,
there must be a transfer of property, or an interest in property capable of
monetary valuation, from the dead to the living at or by reason of death.9
An inheritance or succession tax, on the contrary, is based upon the right of
the beneficiary to take or receive property on the death of its former owner
under the laws governing the devolution of property at death. Under such
a law it is material to determine what interest each beneficiary takes and the
manner and time of taking, and the amount of the tax depends upon the size
of the bequest or devise, the exemption allowed, the relation of the beneficiary
to the decedent, etc.10
Most state inheritance tax laws are based upon the right of the bene-
ficiary to receive. 1  The federal estate tax,1 2 however, is not a tax upon the
right to receive, but is an excise or death duty upon the passing of the prop-
erty from the decedent at death. 1 3  "The tax is on the act of the testator, not
The terms "transfer", "estate" and "succession" taxes, and "death duties" are fre-
quently indiscriminately used to designate the two wholly different forms of tax. It will
tend to clarity, to employ the more usual phraseology and refer hereafter to the tax on the
privilege of transmission as a transfer tax, and that on the privilege of reception as a suc-
cession tax. Cf. Coolidge v. Long, supra note i, at 608, 51 Sup. Ct. at 313.
'Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 537, 47 Sup. Ct. 7io, 7ii (1927); Edwards v.
Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 6z, 44 Sup. Ct. 293 (i924) ; May v. Heiner, supra note i.
9Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50, 44 Sup. Ct. 291, 292 (1924); Lederer v.
Northern Trust Co., 262 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 3d, i92o).
" Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 269, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 226 (1928) ; Nichols v.
Coolidge, supra note 8, at 54I 47 Sup. St. at 713; Leach v. Nichols, 285 U. S. i65, i69, 52
Sup. Ct. 338, 340 (1932) ; Keeney v. New York, 2= U. S. 525, 533, 32 Sup. Ct. io5, io6
(III); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, supra note i; Knowlton v. Moore,
supra note I; Cahen v. Brewster, supra note 3, at 551, 27 Sup. Ct. at 176.. Leach v. Nichols, supra note io (Mass.); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 541, 40
Sup. Ct. 2, 6 (i919) (New Jersey) ; In re Roebling's Estate, 89 N. J. Eq. 163, 168, 104 Atl.
295, 297 (I918); Baker v. East Orange, 95 N. J. L. 365, 368, 111 Atl. 68i, 68z (i919);
People v. McCormick, supra note i (Illinois) ; In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl.
176 (1924). See MAGILL AND MAGUIE, CASES ON TAXATION (93) 466. The New York
transfer tax, however, was on the right to transmit. Matter of Schmidlapp, 236 N. Y. 278,
283, I4O N. E. 697, 698 (1923) ; Home Trust Co. v. Law, 2o4 App. Div. 590, 593, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 710, 713 (I923), aff'd 236 N. Y. 6o7, 142 N. E. 303 (i923); Keith v. Johnson, 271
U. S. I, 8, 46 Sup. Ct. 415, 417 (1926). The Texas statute seems similar to the New York
statute. United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 46 Sup. Ct. 418 (1926). See, however,
State v. Jones, 290 S. W. 244, 248 (927), rev'd II8 Tex. 693, 5 S. W. (2d) 973 (1928).
344 STAT. 9, 27, 69-87 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. (1928) §§ IO9i-1i-2I, as amendedby Act of
June 6, 1932, 47 STAT. 278, 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1932) § iogi et seq.
'Heiner v. Donnan, supra note i; Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, supra note 9; see extracts
quoted infra note 127; Edwards v. Slocum, supra note 8. See also, United States v. Wood-
ward, 256 U. S. 632, 635, 41 Sup. Ct. 615 (i92I) ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 498,
45 Sup. Ct. 6o3, 6o8 (i925). The nature of the Federal Estate Tax was also considered in
the following decisions: Matter of Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 416, 418, 124 N. E. 4, 6, 7
(1919) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 495, 144 N. E. 769, 77r
(i924); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 475, 124 N. E. 265, 267 (i919);
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 238 Mass. 544, 131 N. E. 321
(i92i) ; People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 477, I4 N. E. 662, 663 (i919) ; Corbin
v. Townshend, 92 Conn. 501, 505, io3 Atl. 647, 648 (I918) ; In re Roebling's Estate, supra
note ii; Knight's Estate, 261 Pa. 537, 104 AtI. 765 (1918); Tax Commission v. Lamprecht,
107 Ohio St. 535, 541, 549, 14o N. E. 333, 335, 337 (1923) ; Bingham's Adm'r v. Common-
wealth, 196 Ky. 318, 331, 244 S. W. 781, 787 (1922) ; State v. First Calumet Trust, etc., Co.,
71 Ind. App. 467, 470, 125 N. E. 200 (i919); State ex rel. Smith v. Probate Court, I39
Minn. 21o, i66 N. W. 125 (i918); Estate of Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 195 Pac. 413 (192);
In re Inman's Estate, ioi Ore. i82, 199 Pac. 615 (Ig2I).
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on the receipt of property by the legatees." 14 "The transfer upon death is
taxable, whatsoever the character of the property transferred and to whom-
soever the transfer is made." 15 The distinction between the right to transmit
and the right to receive is fundamental and important.
Inheritance tax statutes generally provide that property transferred by
a grantor in contemplation of death shall be subjected, along with property
passing under his will or by intestacy, to the tax.16 The value of property
transferred in contemplation of death may be included in the value of the
gross estate of the decedent for the purposes of an inheritance tax, because
the transfer is considered to be testamentary in effect and such a provision
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the law.1 7 Transfers in actual
contemplation of death have characteristics in common with transfers at
death so as to justify the inclusion of the former with the latter in the scheme
of taxation. Whether transfers are in contemplation of death is largely a
question of the particular facts involved.1 8 Confronted with the difficulty of
proof of such contemplation, statutory presumptions have been enacted."9
Closely allied with transfers in contemplation of death are those taking
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. While they are within
the same category, for the purpose of taxation,20 there is a clear line of
demarcation between them. Gifts to take effect at or after death are dis-
tinguished from testamentary transfers in that they are made during life,
usually by trust deed or declaration of trust. They are distinguished from
gifts in contemplation of death in that the motive is not considered in the
former. In principle there is no difference between property passing by deed
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the
grantor and property passing by will or intestacy. In either case it is the
privilege of disposing of property after the death of the grantor or testator
2 Mr. Justice Holmes, in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 155, 49 Sup.
Ct. 291 (1929). Cf. Matter of Schmidlapp, supra note ii, at 283, 14o N. E. at 698, where
Judge Cardozo said: "The tax is a charge upon the creation of the right. It is not a charge
upon fruition in enjoyment or possession." 22"Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384, 42 SUP. Ct. 324 (1922)
However, bequests to religious and charitable corporations may be deducted in determining
the value of the net estate upon which the tax is imposed. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, stpra
note 9. Cf. however, Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Pos-
sesson or Enjoyment at Grantor's Death (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 453, 613, 626, where it
is stated that it is difficult to say how much this distinction has influenced the courts.
"Transfers in contemplation of death were first specifically taxed in the United States
by the i8gi amendment to the New York transfer tax law, N. Y. Laws 1891, C. 215, p. 409.
See Bradford, Evolution of the Meaning of the Words "Gifts Made in Contemplation of
Death" it Inheritance Tax Legislation (1923) 9 VA. L. Rxv. 267, 269.
I Keeney v. New York, sumra note io; Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 23, 51
Sup. Ct. 324, 327 (93); United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446 (i931).
Cf. Heiner v. Donnan, supra note 3, at 323, 52 Sup. Ct. at 360.
I Heiner v. Donnan, supra note 3, at 324, 343, 52 Sup. Ct. at 360, 367. For an ex-
haustive analysis of the cases, see Note (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1O28; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R.
1335; Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 989; Note (1926) 43 A. L R. 1229.
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 26o (ig2o) ; Heiner v. Donnan,
supra note 3. See (193) 31 COL. L. REv. io52.
-OUnited States v. Wells, supra note 17, at 116, 5I Sup. Ct. at 451; cf. Heiner v.
Donnan, supra note 3, at 323, 52 Sup. Ct. at 360.
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or of succeeding to it which is taxed.21 The dominant purpose is to reach
substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to prevent evasion of the
tax.22 Gifts intended to take effect at or after death, whether in contempla-
tion of death or not, are taxable under the laws of most of the states and of
the federal government. 23
What is the meaning of the statutory phrase "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death"? The following extract from an
opinion by Circuit Judge Hough merits careful consideration:
The natural inclination of every lawyer is to recognize that
'take effect' is not a phrase of art, to search for some artistic equivalent,
and find it in the word 'vest'. But if, as the result of a passage of title,
the passing estate is vested, whether in fee, for life, in remainder, or in
reversion, even though subject to divestment by subsequent event, then
the transfer is complete, and so is the 'possession or enjoyment', for one
'possesses and enjoys' a reversion as thoroughly as he does a fee, even
though most men prefer a fee to a reversion.
"But if the transfer of an estate results in the immediate vesting
thereof, and of each and every part of the same, the transaction is com-
plete, and the grantor or transferor has no 'interest' left therein; where-
fore on his death there can be found no such 'interest' to include in his
gross estate." 24
Problems as to the interpretation and application of the statutory phrase
imposing a tax upon transfers taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death arise where grantors have created inter vivos trusts, reserving to
themselves certain powers. Such trusts may be classified,25 for the present
discussion, as follows:
I Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549 (1899) ; cf. Armstrong v. State, 72
Ind. App. 303, 312, sub norn. Conway's Est., 12o N. E. 717, 719 (1918), rehearing denied
141 N. E. xv (192o).
'United States v. Wells, supra note 17.
3 PINKETON AND Mn.rsAps, INErF TANcE AND ESTATE TAXES (1926) 112. The
earliest inheritance tax statute in the United States-the Pennsylvania Act of April 7, 1826-
provided for the taxation of transfers intended to take effect at death. See Reish v. Com-
monwealth, io6 Pa. 521 (1884). The New York statute, N. Y. Laws 1885, c. 483, p. 820,
corresponded in its language to the Pennsylvania act in this respect. it re Johnson's Estate,
i9 N. Y. Supp. 963, 965 (1892). The Illinois statute was taken from N. Y. Laws 1892,
c. 399, § I (3). People v. Carpenter, 264 Ill. 4oo, 4o4, io6 N. E. 302, 304 (1914). The
phrase was first used by Congress in the legacy and probate tax statute of 1862, c. 11g,
§ III, 12 STAT. 433, 485 (1862). It was again used in the Inheritance Tax Act of 1898,
c. 448, § 29, 30 STAT. 448, 464 (898). See Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 196 U. S. 480, 491, 25
Sup. Ct 331, 334 (1905). See also Hope, The Function of the Inheritance Tax: The Taxp-
tilon of Inter Vivos Transfers (1933) 1I TAX MAG. 5; Surrey and Aronson, inter Vivos
Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1332.
"' Frew v. Bowers, supra note 3, at 627. After considerable diversity of opinion, these
words may now be regarded as having an interpretation susceptible of some meaning. For
an extensive note on the state cases see Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 864-9o3. See also
Rottschaefer, supra note 15, treating both state and federal decisions, but principally the
former.
"Cf. Runk, Differing Federal and State Interpretations of the Transfer Inheritance
Tax Applied to Trusts Inter Vivos (1930) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. i85.
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A. The grantor creates a trust for the benefit of others during their
lives, with remainder over, reserving to himself a power of revocation during
his life.
B. The grantor creates a trust, in terms irrevocable, reserving the income
to himself during his life, with remainder over.
C. The grantor reserves both the income for his life and the power to
revoke, with remainder over.
D. The grantor creates an irrevocable trust with the income payable to
others for their lives, with remainders over.
E. The grantor reserves a right to alter, amend, or revoke the trust in
conjunction with either the trustee or the.beneficiary.
F. The grantor reserves the life income and a power of appointment,
with remainder over in default of appointment, but not the power to revoke.
G. The grantor has or reserves an expectancy or a possibility of reverter.
The application of the federal estate tax to these types of trusts will be
considered. In the course of the discussion references will be made to cor-
responding decisions under state succession taxes. The general question is
whether, upon the grantor's death, there is a transfer taking effect in pos-
session or enjoyment within the meaning of the taxing statute.
A. In the first class, the specific question is whether the reservation of
the power of revocation, even though unexercised, postpones the possession
and enjoyment of the beneficiaries until the grantor's death. The federal
courts, and some state courts, hold that there is a taxable transfer upon the
grantor's death.2" The termination of the power of control inures to the
benefit of the beneficiary and thus brings about, at death, the completion of
that shifting of the economic benefits which is the real object of the tax. A
power of revocation is analogous to a power of appointment. Where there
is a power of revocation, the death of the grantor terminates his right to sub-
stitute a testamentary disposition for the inter vivos disposition, and the
- Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.; Chase National Bank v. United States; McCaughn
v. Fidelity Trust Co., all supra note 2; United States v. Stark, 32 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A.
6th, x929); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d)- 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928);
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (915) ; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra
note IO; Hill v. Nichols, i F. (2d) 139 (D. Mass. 1927). In Chase National Bank v.
United States, supra note 2, proceeds of life insurance policies were involved. However,
where the insured had no right of revocation respecting the beneficiary, the proceeds on the
death of the insured are not a part of the decedent's estate for taxation. Anthracite Trust
Co. v. Phillips, 49 F. (2d) 91o (M. D. Pa. 1931); Reed v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 166
(1931). See also Sampson v. United States, i F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1932). State and
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Daughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E. 621 (1924) ; Plainfield Trust
Co. v. McCutcheon, 8 N. J. Misc. 593, 151 AtI. 279 (930), aff'd io8 N. J. L. 201, 154 AtI.
629 (1931); (1929) 29 Coi L. REv. l025. Contra: People v. Northern Trust Co., supra
note 13; Re Miller, 236 N. Y. 290, 14o N. E. 701 (1923); Dolan's Estate, supra note iI;
cf. In re Miller's Estate, 43 Nev. 12, 185 Pac. 565 (1919), aff'd sub huno. Nickel v. State,
256 U. S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 467 (1921).
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failure to make such substitution is tantamount to an expressed declaration
of the grantor that his previous settlement should stand. The power of revo-
cation, unexercised by the grantor, leaves the transfer as to him incomplete,
and gives him a legal interest which is subject to the tax, whether it be one
of transfer or succession.
The Revenue Act of 1924 added a new subsection 27 which specifically
included in the gross estate the value of property with respect to which the
decedent had created a trust and had reserved power in himself to alter,
amend, or revoke the same. The general purpose and intent of the Act in
this respect were to reach dispositions which are really testamentary in so far
as taxation is concerned.
28
B. In the second class, the specific question is whether the reservation
by the grantor of the income for his life postpones the vesting of the ultimate
beneficiary's estate in possession and enjoyment. The great majority of the
state courts consider that the retention of the income by the grantor for his
life delays the vesting of the remaindermen's estate in possession or enjoy-
ment until the grantor's death and hold that a taxable interest passes at the
death of the grantor.29  On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United
States recently held that no taxable interest passed at the death of the grantor,
title having vested at the time of the execution of the trust deed."0
In May v. Heiner 31 the grantor made an irrevocable deed of trust by the
terms of which she gave the income of the property to her husband during
-§3o2(d) 43 STAT. 304 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. (1928) § 1O94 n. Cf. United States v.
Field 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 250 (1921).
United States v. Stark, supra note 26, at 454. Cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376,
50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930); Reinecke v. Smith, 61 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); and
Stetson v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 390 (932), in connection with § 166 of the Revenue
Act of x932, 47 STAT. 22I (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1932) § 3166.
'Reish v. Commonwealth, upra note 23; In re Dolan's Estate, supra note ii; In re
Barber's Estate, 304 Pa. 235, 241, 155 AtI. 565, 567 (1931) ; American Board of Commis-
sioners v. Bugbee, 98 N. J. L. 84, 11S Atl. 700 (1922), aff'd sub norn. Congregational Home
Missionary Society v. Bugbee, ioi N. J. L. 214, 127 Atl. 192 (1925); In re Honeyman, 98
N. J. Eq. 638, 129 Atl. 393 (1925); Iih re Russell, 1O4 N. J. Eq. 578, 146 Atl. 361 (1929),
(1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1O25; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bughee, 6 N. J. Misc. 415,
141 Atl. 579 (i928); Worcester Bank v. Commissioner, 275 Mass. 216, 175 N. E. 726
(ig3i) ; State Street Trust Co. v. Treasurer, m0g Mass. 373, 95 N. E. 852 (1911);
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note io (interpreting a Mass. statute) ; People v. Northern
Trust Co., 330 Ill. 238, i61 N. E. 525 (1928) ; People v. McCormick, supra note I; People
v. Kelly, 281 Ill. 509, 75 N. E. 1O38 (i9o5) ; People v. Welch's Estate, 235 Mich. 555, 209
N. W. 930 (1926) ; Matter of Schmidlapp, supra note II; Matter of Patterson, 146 App.
Div. 286, 13o N. Y. Supp. 970 (I91I), aff'd 204 N. Y. 677, 98 N. E. iiog (1912); Matter
of Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 19o N. Y. Supp. 895 (1921); aff'd 2o2 App. Div. 751 (1922);
Matter of Bostwick, i6o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (I899). Contra: State & City Bank &
Trust Co. v. Daughton, supra note 26; Downes v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 157 Md. 87,
145 Ati. 350 (929).
8' May v. Heiner, supra note 2, (1930) 44 HAnv. L. REv. 131, (1930) 29 MicH. L. RiEv.
123; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782, 51 Sup. Ct. 342 (ig3i), aff'9 41 F. (2d)
732 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 783, 51 Sup. CtA. 343 931), revg
44 F. (2d) 9o2 (C. C. A. 8th, 193o) ; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784, 51 Sup. Ct. 343
(I93I), rev'g 43 F. (26) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o) ; Hodgkins v. Commissioner, 44 F. (26)
43 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), certiorari denied 283 U. S. 825, 51 Sup. Ct. 350 (93). See also
Coolidge v. Long, supra note i; McCaughn v. Carnill, 43 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930),
certiorari denied 283 U. S. 825, 51 Sup. Ct. 350 (193I). See also Boyd v. United States,
34 F. (24) 488 (D. Conn. 1929).
Supra note 2.
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his lifetime and after his death to herself during her lifetime, with remainders
over to her children. It was held that the transfer was not intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after her death, within the legal signifi-
cance of those words; that the transfer became effective immediately upon the
delivery of the deed of trust, she having definitely disposed of not only the
possession of the property but also the right of enjoyment; and that, there-
fore, the corpus of the trust should not be included in the value of the gross
estate of the grantor for purposes of the federal estate tax. The contingency
whether she predeceased her husband or not was immaterial. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, writing for an unanimous court, said:
". .. At the death of Mrs. May no interest in the property held
under the trust deed passed from her to the living; title thereto had been
definitely fixed by the trust deed. The interest therein which she pos-
sessed immediately prior to her death was obliterated by that event." 32
In Burnet v. Northern Trust Co. 33 the decedent before her death had
conveyed by an irrevocable deed property to a trustee, which was to pay the
income to her during her life and after her death to distribute the corpus
equally among her children. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, following May v. Heiner, held the transfer was non-taxable. Circuit
Judge Evans said:
It is true that the settlor in the May case provided in her
trust deed for the life use by her husband and, upon his death, she sur-
viving, for the life use of herself. This difference in the facts, however,
seems to us immaterial. The conclusion, under this decision, seems
inescapable that property conveyed by an irrevocable deed of trust, to
third parties, with no reversionary interest, contingent or otherwise, in
the settlor, though the income during the settlor's life be payable to
settlor, does not pass at the settlor's death, but at the date of the execu-
tion and delivery of the deed of trust." 3'
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision in a per curiam opinion upon the
authority of May v. Heiner.
In the Morsman case,3" property was transferred to a trustee to pay the
income to the grantor during life and for a period of two years after the
M 28I U. S. at 243, 50 Sup. Ct. at 287.
13Supra note 3o. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the state succession tax on the
trust property. People v. Northern Trust Co., .rpra note 29, at 246, i61 N. E. at 528. In
the government's petition for a writ of certiorari in the case it is stated (p. 23) that the
Solicitor General (Thacker) and counsel, who have considered the decision below, 41 F.
(2d) 732 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o), in the Department of justice, do not share "the gravest
doubt as to the correctness" of that decision entertained by officials of the Treasury Depart-
ment, because of the decision in May v. Heiner, supra note 2. The government's supporting
brief concludes with the statement that it was prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and presents the views of the Treasury Departnmt upon the question involved. Evidently
the Solicitor General considered that May v. Heiner was controlling.
'4I F. (2d) at 732.
Supra note 30.
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grantor's death equally to the grantor's sons. At the expiration of the two-
year period the trust was to terminate and the corpus divided among the sons.
The power to change the trustee was reserved to the grantor and all the bene-
ficiaries. The trustee was given full power of management of the property,
provided that in selling and making investments the trustee was to follow
the written advice of the grantor and one of the beneficiaries. The reserva-
tion of income, which was to cease or pass to others on the grantor's death,
did not subject the corpus to the federal estate tax. In this instance the
Supreme Court, upon certiorari, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in a per curiam opinion, based upon May v. Heiner. At
the same time a third per curiam opinion was rendered, likewise upon the
authority of May v. Heiner, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
In the McCormick case 36 the grantor established a trust whereby the
income was to be accumulated and added to the principal, except so much as
she might request to be paid to her to supplement her income from other
property should the latter not amount to a certain sum and for such charitable
purposes as she might designate. Upon the grantor's death, the income was
to be divided equally among her children for their lives. The trust was to
terminate on the death of the last of the beneficiaries. The grantor might
terminate the trust with the consent of any one of the beneficiaries and the
trust properties reverted to her if she survived the beneficiaries. The trustee
was restricted from making any change in the trust property without the
written approval of the grantor, and she retained the power to direct the
voting of stock in the trust estate. The transfer was held non-taxable.
The three cases were all decided upon the same date. The following
day the Secretary of the Treasury requested that the statute be amended in
order that tax avoidance might be prevented.37 A joint resolution was
passed the same day.
35
I Supra note 30. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the state succession tax on the
trust property. People v. McCormick, supra note i.
"'74 CONG. REc. 7198 (1931). Senator Smoot stated on the floor that the decisions of
the Supreme Court came almost like a bombshell, because nobody ever anticipated such
decisions, since everybody thought the law was perfectly plain. 74 CONG. REc. 7o78-9
(1931). See, however, the evident opinion of the Solicitor General to the contrary, m zpra
note 33.
The amendment passed both Houses without objection, 74 CONG. RxC. 7078-9 (93),
and was approved and signed by the President the same day. 74 CONG. REC. 7392 (93).
Senator Walsh of Montana entertained "very grave doubt" as to the constitutionality of
the amendment. 74 CONG. REC. 7079 (93). The Revenue Act of 1926, § 302 (c), 44
STAT. 7o (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1o94 (c) (1928), as amended by the joint resolution, as
respects this subsection, read as follows: "To the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, including a transfer
under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period not ending before his
death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom;
except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth."
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Three more recent decisions may be properly included in this second
class, where the grantor reserves the income of the trust during his lifetime.
In the Hodgkins case 39 the irrevocable trust deed directed the payment of the
income to the grantor for life, and thereafter to his wife during her life.
The trust was to continue thereafter during the lifetime of the grantor's son,
with remainders over. The son might elect to terminate the trust for his
own benefit ten years after the death of the grantor and his wife. The trans-
fer was held non-taxable as one effective in possession or enjoyment at or
after death. Circuit Judge Evans, again writing for the court, said:
The legal effect of this provision was to limit and restrict
and perhaps postpone the beneficiary's full enjoyment of the fund trans-
In this connection see, T. D. 4314 (Int. Rev. 1931) ; and T. D. 4340 (Int. Rev. 1932),
amending U. S. Treas. Reg. 7o, Art. 2o. The subsection was further amended by the
Revenue Act of 1932 , 47 STAT. 279 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § iog4 (c) (Supp. 1932), so as
to read as follows: "(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or, otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at any time made
a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." The
SE-N. REP. No. 665. 72d Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 9488, on the Revenue Act of 1932 has the
following comment at 49: "The purpose of this amendment to section 3o2 (c) of the Revenue
Act of 1926 is to clarify in certain respects the amendments made to that section by the
joint resolution of March 3, 193i, which was adopted to render taxable a transfer under
which the decedent reserved the income for his life. The joint resolution was designed to
avoid the effects of decisions of the Supreme Court holding such a transfer not taxable if
irrevocable and not made in contemplation of death. Certain new matter has also been
added, which is without retroactive effect.
The changes are: (i) "The insertion of the words 'or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death', is to reach, for example, a transfer where decedent reserved
to himself semi-annual payments of the income of a trust which he had established, but with
the provision that no part of the trust income between the last semi-annual payment to him
and his death should be paid to him or his estate, or where he reserves the income, not
necessarily for remainder of his life, but for a period in the ascertainment of which the date
of his death was a necessary element.
(2) "The insertion of the words 'or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death', which is to reach, for example, a transfer where decedent, 70 years old, reserves
the income for an extended term of years and dies during the term, or where he is to have
the income from and after the death of another person until his own death, and such other
person predeceases him. This is a clarifying change and does not represent new matter.
(3) "The insertion of the words 'the right to the income' in place of the words 'the
income' is designed to reach a case where decedent had the right to the income, though he
did not actually receive it. This is also a clarifying change.
(4) "The insertion of the words 'either alone or in conjunction with any person' is to
reach a case where decedent had a right, with the concurrence of another person or persons.
to designate those who should possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
"The amendments to section 3o2 (f) and section 315 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1926 are
to bring these sections into agreement with section 302 (c) of the 1926 Act, as ,amended, in
the respects above indicated."
Almost contemporaneously therewith the New York Legislature amended its estate tax
law, which is patterned after and closely follows the federal law, to make § 249-r (3)
conform to the 1931 amendment of § 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. However, the
New York law has not as yet been amended to conform to the provisions of § 302 (c) as
amended by the Revenue Act of 1932. On April 27, 1933, Governor Lehman vetoed Asssem-
bly Bill No. 1886 which, among other things, was intended to conform § 294-r (3) of the New
York Tax Law to § 302 (C) of the Revenue Act of 1932. See also, N. Y. Laws 1932, C. 320,
p. 193, adding a new subdivision (7-a) to § 249-r of article io-c, New York Estate Tax,
added by N. Y. Laws 1930, C. 710, superseding arts. io and io-A.
'Hodgkins v. Commissioner, supra note 30.
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ferred. It was not indicative of any control by the settlor during the
life of the trust agreement. It in no way impeached the irrevocable
character of the agreement. It did not evidence an intention on the
settlor's part to make the transfer effective in possession or in enjoyment
at or after his death." 40
And in McCaughn v. Carnill 41 the decedent in his lifetime transferred
property to trustees. The income was payable to the grantor during his life,
and upon his death to his widow for her life. After the death of both, the
income was payable to their children with remainders over. The grantor
retained no power to revoke or amend the trust and the transfer was held not
to have been intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the death of the grantor under the Act of 1924. Circuit Judge Davis said:
The transfer of the corpus of this fund was not testamen-
tary in character and was, as above stated, beyond recall by the donor.
At his death no interest in this trust fund held under the trust instru-
ment passed from him to the living. The transfer had already been
made and title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed." 42
Finally, in Boyd v. United States,43 the grantor made a trust, without
reserving power to amend or revoke, with directions to pay a portion of the
income to himself for life, the balance to be added to principal. On his death,
the corpus was to be distributed to his heirs, subject to the rights of his
mother. It was held that the transfer was not subject to the federal estate
tax, notwithstanding the fact that beneficiaries' enjoyment was postponed
until the death of the grantor. The court said:
. . So long as the settlor retained no title, and no right to
acquire any, nor any power of disposition of the trust, the fact that the
beneficiaries were postponed until the settlor's death to an actual enjoy-
ment of the corpus of the trust is immaterial." 44
C. In the third situation, where the grantor retains the power of revo-
cation and the income for life, both federal and state courts impose the tax.
The state courts regard the retention of the income by the grantor for his life
as the test of taxability,45 whereas the federal courts consider the reservation
4044 F. (2d) at 44.
"Supra note 30. Contra: McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co., ii F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A.
3d, 1926) ; Reed v. Howbert, 8 F. (2d) 641 (D. Colo. 1925).
43 F. (2d) at 70.
SSupra note 3o. Cf. Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (1927). Contra:
Tips v. Bass, 21 F. (2d) 46o (D. Tex. 1927).
34 F. (2d) at 490.
'Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 At1. 176 (1924) ; Re Miller, supra note 26; Matter
of Carnegie, 2o3 App. Div. 91, I95 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1922), aff'd 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E.
266 (1923) ; People v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 13; Dexter v. Treasurer and Receiver
General, 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877 (1923).
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of the power of revocation the criterion of taxation.4 6  Judge Cardozo has
said:
A gift by deed of trust to take effect in enjoyment upon
the death of the donor, with the reservation of intermediate use, and
with complete power of revocation, approaches so nearly to a gift by
will that the legislature may declare their substantial identity for the
purpose of taxation." 17
D. In the fourth type of case, in which the grantor reserves neither the
income nor the power to revoke, it has been held 48 generally that when the
grantor dies there is no taxable transfer, the beneficial enjoyment and pos-
session having passed immediately to the beneficiaries upon the execution of
the trust deed. In Shukert v. Allen 41 the testator had conveyed certain secur-
ities in trust to accumulate the income (subject to certain deductions in case
of the extreme destitution of the testator's wife or of any of the beneficiaries
named) until thirty years had elapsed, unless the last of the beneficiaries
should have died more than twenty-one years before that date, and then to
divide the principal and undistributed income among those of his three chil-
dren then living and the descendants living of such as might theretofore have
died. Mr. Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the Court said:
.. . The transfer was immediate and out and out, leaving no
interest remaining in the testator. The trust in its terms has no refer-
ence to his death but is the same and unaffected whether he lives or dies.
Although the circuit court of appeals seems to have thought otherwise,
the interest of the children respectively was vested as soon as the instru-
ment was executed, even though it might have been divested as to any
one of them in favor of his issue if any, or of the surviving beneficiaries,
if he died before the termination of the trust.
But it seems to us tolerably plain, that when the grantor
parts with all his interest in the property to other persons in trust, with
no thought of avoiding taxes, the fact that the income vested in the
beneficiaries was to be accumulated for them instead of being handed to
them to spend, does not make the trust one intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's death." "0
'" Home Trust Co. v. Edwards, 30 F. (2d) 976 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) ; Hanna v. United
States, 68 Court Cl. 45 (1929), certiorari denied 28o U. S. 612, 5o Sup. Ct. 161 (1930) ;
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2; Dean v. Willcuts, 32 F. (2d) 374 (D. Minn.
1929) ; United States v. Stark; Bullen v. Wisconsin, both supra note 26; Saltonstall v.
Saltonstall, supra note io.
'1 Matter of Schmidlapp, supra note ii, at 284, 14o N. E. at 699.
Is Shukert v. Allen, supra note 43; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2;
Brady v. Ham, 45 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. Ist, I93O), (1931) 44 HAxv. L. Rxv. 653;
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, supra note 26; In re Prange's Will, 201 Wis. 636,
231 N. W. 271 (193o) ; Highfield v. Equitable Trust Co., 155 Atl. 724 (Del. Super. 1931);
Dexter v. Treasurer and Receiver General, supra note 45.
" Supra note 43.
273 U. S. at 547, 548, 47 Sup. Ct. at 461.
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Therefore, if the beneficial use or enjoyment of the property is vested in the
beneficiaries, or is accumulated by a trustee for their benefit and not the
grantor's, then from the aspect of enjoyment the transaction lacks the attri-
butes that constitute it one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death.'
In this connection, Coolidge v. Long 52 should be considered. There the
grantors conveyed certain properties to a trustee to pay the income to them-
selves in stated proportions during their joint lives, thereafter wholly to the
survivor and upon the death of the survivor to divide the principal equally
among their five sons; provided that if any of the sons should predecease the
survivor his share should go to those entitled to take his property under
intestate succession and provided further that in no event should a widow of
any such deceased son take more than one-half of such share. The grantors
released their rights to the income prior to death. Massachusetts sought to
tax the succession under an act in force when the survivor died on the ground
that not until the death of the survivor did the property vest in the sons or
their successors. No act so taxing the succession was in force when the
trust was executed. The state court 11 upheld the tax upon the assumption
that there could not be a manucaption of the property by the ultimate remain-
dermen until the termination of the trust, but the Supreme Court reversea
this decision, and in so doing Mr. Justice Butler said:
By the deed of each Grantor one-fifth of the remainder
was immediately vested in each of the sons subject to be divested only
by his death before the death of the survivor of the settlors. It was a
grant in praesenti to be possessed and enjoyed by the sons upon the death
of such survivor. Blanchard v. Blanchard, i Allen 223; Clarke v. Fay,
205 Mass. 228; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 379, and cases cited.
And see United States v. Fidelity Trust Co., 222 U. S. 158; Henry v.
United States, 251 U. S. 393. The provisions for the payment of in-
come to the settlors during their lives did not operate to postpone the
vesting in the sons of the right of possession or enjoyment. The set-
tlors divested themselves of all control over the principal; they had no
power to revoke or modify the trust. Coolidge v. Loring (235 Mass.
223, 126 N. E. 276). Upon the happening of the event specified with-
out more, the trustees were bound to hand over the property to the bene-
ficiaries. Neither the death of Mrs. Coolidge nor of her husband was a
generating source of any right in the remaindermen. Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56. Nothing moved from her or him or from the
estates of either when she or he died. There was no transmission then.
The rights of the remaindermen, including possession and enjoyment
upon the termination of the trusts, were derived solely from the deeds.
The situation would have been precisely the same if the possibility of
51Compare the quotation from judge Hough's opinion in Frew v. Bowers, supra note 24.
52Supra note i. The same deed of trust was before the Court in Nichols v. Coolidge,
supra note 8. See also Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass. 22o, 126 N. E. 276 (i92o).
* Coolidge v. Commissioner, 268 Mass. 443, 167 N. E. 757 (1929).
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divestment had been made to cease upon the death of a third person
instead of upon the death of the survivor of the settlor or the settlors.
The succession, when the time came, did not depend upon any permis-
sion or grant of the Commonwealth. While the sons, if occasion should
arise, might by appropriate suit require the trustees to account, it is to
be borne in mind that the property was never in the custody of the law
or of any court. Resort might be had to the law to enforce the rights
that had vested. But the Commonwealth was powerless to condition
possession or enjoyment of what had been conveyed to them by the
deeds. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, and cases cited.
"The fact that each son was liable to be divested of the remainder
by his own death before that of the survivor of the grantors does not
render the succession incomplete. The vesting of actual possession and
enjoyment depended upon an event which must inevitably happen by the
efflux of time, and nothing but his failure to survive the settlors could
prevent it. Blanchard v. Blanchard, supra; Moore v. Lyons, 25 Wend.
119, 144. Succession is effected as completely by a transfer of a life
estate to one and remainder over to another as by a transfer in fee.
Reinecke v. Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 347-348." 54
In Nichols v. Bradley " the grantor created a trust providing that one-
half of the income of the trust estate should be paid to her during her lifetime,
and that the other half should be divided equally among her three daughters
and their issue, but that in case of the death of all of the daughters without
issue during the life of the grantor, the entire income should be paid to her
for life and then to others. The case was decided before May v. Heiner,6
and apparently it was assumed that one-half of the fund was subject to the
tax. The government contended that the entire value of the trust fund should
be included, because of her contingent right to get the entire income in the
event her three daughters predeceased her. But the court said:
".. . upon making the trust deed, Mrs. Bradley parted with the
possession and enjoyment of this half of the property contributed by her
to the trust, and that she was to have no reversionary interest in this half
unless the daughters and their issue failed to survive her, or (what is
the same thing) unless she survived the daughters and their issue, which
she did not do. Having died first, no reversionary.interest ever arose in
her favor. Her death did not pass the right to the possession and enjoy-
ment of the half of the property and income here in question from her
to the daughters and their issue. That right passed to them at once by
the declaration of trust, subject to defeasance in case they failed to
survive Mrs. Bradley. Her death, however, before that of her daugh-
ters, foreclosed the possibility of a reversionary interest arising in her
favor. In other words, her death did not effect the transfer of the pos-
session and enjoyment of the property and income to the daughters from
and after that time, but, having occurred during the lifetime of the
282 U. S. at 597, 598, 51 Sup. Ct. at 3o9.
"27 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. ist, 1928).
" See text "pra 942 et seq.
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daughters, it foreclosed the possibility of her acquiring a reversionary
interest in this half of the property." 57
In Burnet v. Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings Bank "I an irrevocable
trust was created under which the estate conveyed was to go to the sons of
the grantor or the survivor, if either survived for twelve years. In the event
of the death of both of the sons prior to the expiration of twelve years from
the date of the trust, the grantor having previously died, the trust estate was
to go to the devisees or heirs of the grantor. No income was to be paid to
the grantor. The sons survived the grantor and the twelve year period. The
government contended that the trust property should be included in the
grantor's estate, because the rights of the sons were dependent upon their
surviving the grantor and the twelve year period. The court held, however,
that their interest vested under the trust instrument, and that sinice the sons
survived the trust term and were entitled to the whole estate, the contingency
that the grantor might have taken was valueless. Circuit Judge Wilbur said:
.. . The Commissioner contends that the rights of the sons of
the trustor were so far dependent upon the death of the trustor that their
possession and enjoyment thereof took effect at or after his death, and
hence the estate was subject to the estate tax. It is clear, however, that
the death of the trustor in no way affected the disposition of the property
to them. Their interest was fixed by the trust conveyance; it is true
that the interest of either was to be divested by his death if it occurred
before December I, 1929, and that in the event both died before that
date the estate would vest in either the devisees or the heirs of the
trustor, as the case might be.
"As to this contingent remainder, it is clear that the right thereto
was fixed when, and only when, the settlor died. This contingent interest
would be one that would take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the death of the trustor. It has been demonstrated by the passage
of time that this contingency is valueless, as both sons survived the ter-
mination of the trust, and are now entitled to the whole estate. The
Commissioner did not undertake to levy a tax upon this contingent
interest, and makes no claim of his right to do so now. If the value of
this contingent interest is properly to be considered as a part of the gross
estate of the trustor, no claim of the Commissioner is based thereon.
His claim is that the whole trust estate conveyed in the deed is to be
added to the gross estate for the purpose of fixing the tax thereon. This
contention is largely based upon the untenable point made by him that
the entire interest of the sons comes within the purview of the law taxing
estates that vest in possession or enjoyment after death. To the other
cases herein cited on this point we add May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238." 59
1727 F. (2d) at 48.
rs45 F. (2dY 773 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), certiorari denied 283 U. S. 825, 5I Sup. Ct. 350
(1931).
r Id. at 776-777.
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Finally, in Curley v. Tait, Judge Rose said:
If all beneficial ownership and possession irrevocably
passes from the transferor at the time of the transfer, it would seem to
be immaterial whether it goes to one person or to several, and if to sev-
eral, whether their enjoyment is to be simultaneous or successive, and, if
the latter, at what time or upon the happening of what event the rights
of one give place to those of another." 60
E. Where the grantor reserves to himself alone the power to revoke the
trust, such reservation, we have seen, renders the transfer incomplete under
the federal estate tax law until his death. But where the grantor provides
that he may revoke the trust in conjunction with either the trustee or the
beneficiaries, the situation is somewhat different.
In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers 6 the deed of trust reserved
no income to the grantor, but provided that the income should be distributed
to the issue of the grantor in certain proportions. At the death of the grantor
the principal should be distributed to and among the issue of the grantor in
such shares as he might by will appoint, and, in default of such appointment,
to his then surviving issue. The deed provided that the grantor, but only
with the written consent of the trustee, might modify or revoke the trust, in
whole or in part. The grantor died without having exercised the limited
power of appointment reserved to him. The question was whether the corpus
of the trust was a part of the decedent's net estate subject to the estate tax.
The government sought to distinguish Nichols v. Coolidge 6 2 on the theory
that here there was a reserved power to modify. It was held that Section
402 (e) of the Act of 1919 did not justify a tax on the limited power of
appointment 6 3 reserved by the grantor. Circuit Judge Manton said: 64
By the indenture of May, 1916, the settlor parted with all
control over the corpus of the trust, except a conditional power to
revoke, and then only with the consent of the trustee. The trustee had
obligations with respect to the trust property and the rights of the bene-
ficiaries. Its consent could be granted only with due regard for such
duties. Thus the settlor was beyond the power legally to control."
276 Fed. 840, 842 (D. Md. i92i).
'Supra note 26. See also Stone v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 1, 5 (1932).
'Supra note 8. It will be noted that in the case being discussed the court reached its
conclusion by its interpretation of the language of the taxing act and found it unnecessary to
consider any question of the constitutionality of the act.
I See TRUSTS RFsTATEmENT, TENTATIrV DRAFT No. i (Am. L. Inst. I93o) § 27b; Gray,
Release aizd Discharge of Powers (I9II) 24 H~Av. L. REV. 511, 512; Matter of Harbeck,
I6I N. Y. 211, 220, 55 N. E. 850, 852 (igoo) ; N. Y. REAL PRop. LAw (Igog) §§ 134, I35;
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare 6 7, 79 (Eng. I844) ; Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344, 351,
5 Sup. Ct. 194, i97 (1844) ; Jones v. Clifton, IOI U. S. 225 (1879). Under §7oa of the
Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 565 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § iio (927), the trustee shall be
vested with the title of the bankrupt, "to all powers which he might have exercised for his
own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised for some other person." Montague
v. Silsbee, 2IS Mass. io7, io5 N. E. 6ii (914) ; Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 8., 14o N. E.
418 (1923) ; see also Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U. S. 427, 36 Sup. Ct. 391 (1I16).
4 29 F. (2d) at I6-i8.
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Continuing he said:
".. . When, in May, 1916, the settlor made his indenture, he
transferred his title and also all possession and enjoyment. His reserved
powers were not conditions of the vesting of the estate, but merely con-
ditional limitations."
Concluding he said:
But here there is no such absolute and unconditional power
(to revoke the trust). The trustee's consent was necessary for the
settlor's exercise of the power. It therefore required the action of both.
The power could not be exercised by the settlor alone, and therefore it
was not a general power exercised by the decedent, within the meaning
of the statute (402 (e) of the Act of i919). Congress intended only
to tax the general power, which the settlor might have exercised himself
or treated the property as part of his estate. It is apparent Congress
made such a distinction between a general power exercised by a decedent
and a limited power requiring more than the act or will of the settlor."
A power of revocation somewhat similar to the one in the preceding
case, that is, dependent upon the consent of the trustee, was before the court
in Hill v. Nichols,"5 which involved the same deed of trust in the Salton-
stall " case. The transfer was held non-taxable under the federal estate tax,
but the state succession tax was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The difference in the two statutes, the former upon the right to
transmit and the latter upon the right to receive the property, is clearly the
basis of the different results.67
In the Reinecke case with respect to each of the "five trusts" the grantor
reserved the power to alter, change or modify the trust, which was to be
exercised in the case of four of them by the grantor and the single beneficiary
of each trust, acting jointly, and in the case of one of these trusts, by the
grantor and a majority of the named beneficiaries, acting jointly. Mr. Justice
Stone, in holding that the trusts were not taxable on the ground that they
were intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death
of the grantor, said:
.. . If it be assumed that the power to modify the trust was
broad enough to authorize disposition of the trust property among new
beneficiaries or to revoke the trusts, still it was not one vested in the
settlor alone, as were the reserved powers in the case of the two trusts
(terms of which reserved tc grantor alone power of revocation). He
could not effect any change in the beneficial interest in the trusts without
the consent in the case of four of the trusts, of the person entitled to
that interest, and in the case of one trust without the consent of a major-
Sipra note 26, at 141.
Supra note io.0 1Cf. Coolidge v. Long, supra note I, at 596, 51 Sup. Ct. at 3o8.
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ity of those so entitled. Since the power to revoke or alter was dependent
on the consent of the one entitled to the beneficial, and consequently
adverse, interest, the trust, for all practical purposes, had passed as
completely from any control by decedent which might inure to his own
benefit as if the gift had been absolute." 68
In Brady v. Ham 6' the declaration of trust provided that the income
should be paid to the grantor's daughters, with remainders over. The
grantor reserved power to do practically anything with the trust fund except
apply its economic benefits to herself. The commissioner included the trust
fund as a part of the estate of the grantor upon her death under Section
302 (d) and (h) of the Revenue Act of 1926. The court decided that the
transfer was not taxable. Circuit judge Wilson, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said:
The decedent, Elizabeth S. Haynes, by her declaration of
trust expressly deprived herself of the enjoyment of all economic benefits
in the trust estate. While she might control the final disposition of it so
far as the beneficiaries were concerned, she could not restore to herself
any beneficial enjoyment of it. She reserved no power of revocation
as in the first 'two trusts' in the Reinecke case. So far as any economic
benefits of the trust estate were concerned, they passed to the trustees at
the time of the execution of the declaration of trust. The enjoyment
of them may not have been definitely settled on the beneficiaries until
her death, and the beneficiaries may have been subject to a succession
tax, but the right of enjoyment of any economic benefits thereof irrevo-
cably passed from the decedent in 1911 ."70
The government in White v. Erskine 71 contended that by subdivision
(d) of Section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926 Congress undertook to
impose a new form of excise tax, namely, a tax on the power to alter or
revoke before death a trust created by the grantor, whether the power be of
a general or limited nature. But the court held that if there be no property
or beneficial interest in property passing from the decedent at death, there
can be no estate tax within the meaning of Section 301, which imposed the
tax. Circuit judge Wilson again delivered the opinion of the court, saying:
In other words, where a grantor, either alone or in con-
junction with anyone not a beneficiary under the trust, has retained 'the
power to revest in himself title to any part of the trust,' to quote from
section 2 19 (g), then the body of the trust at the death of the decedent
may be included in the value of the gross estate; but where the decedent
has no such power except by the consent of an adverse party as one of
the beneficiaries, or as in this instance of the trustee for the beneficiaries,
Supra note 2, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125.
o Supra note 48. See, however, Porter v. Commissioner, infra note 75.
70 45 F. (2d) at 456.
7147 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. ist, 193I). See, however, Porter v. Commissioner, infra
note 75, and the extract quoted therefrom, infra note 128.
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the right of revocation is gone from the donor and also all beneficial
interest for taxing purposes under section 301 of the act." 72
And in Cover v. Burnet 73 the grantor reserved the right, at any time
during his life, to alter, change, or modify the trust, "without the right to
withdraw any part of the principal." The transfer was held not subject to
the estate tax as one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death. Chief Justice Martin, speaking for the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, said:
. . The grantor reserved no power to repossess himself at any
time of any part of the principal of the fund, nor to withdraw the same
from the beneficiaries who were to receive it under the terms of the trust
instrument. Accordingly, the right reserved by the grantor to alter,
change, or modify the trust did not extend to a redisposition of the
corpus of the fund, and even if by force of the reservation the grantor
could have demanded and obtained the entire income from the trust
fund during his lifetime, the irrevocable grant of the remainder would
not have been affected thereby." 74
However, in the recent case of Porter v. Commissioner 75 the Supreme
Court upheld the tax under Section 302 (d) of the Act of 1926 when the
grantor reserved unto himself alone the power to change the beneficiaries but
without the right to designate himself or his estate for the reason that the
reserved power was "the substantial equivalent of a general power of appoint-
ment by will". While the power reserved was not absolute, it was deemed "a
substitute for testamentary disposition". Mr. Justice Butler said:
.. . Here the donor retained until his death power enough to
enable him to make a complete revision of all that he had done in respect
to the creation of the trusts even to the extent of taking the property
from the trustees and beneficiaries named and transferring it absolutely
7247 F. (2d) at ioi6.
7353 F. (2d) 915 (App. D. C. 1931). See, however, Porter v. Commissioner, infra
note 75.
7' 53 F. (2d) at 916.
7253 Sup. Ct. 451 (I933), aff'g 6o F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aff'g 23 B. T. A.
ioi6 (193). Circuit Judge Learned Hand said, 6o F. (2d) at 674, "Though he has finally
denuded himself, he controls the disposition while he lives; the existing limitations are con-
ditional upon his pleasure. A gift is a bilateral transacton and demands a donee as well as
a donor; it is incomplete though the donor has parted with his interest, if the donee remains
indeterminate, and the beneficiaries are determined only when the power to change them
ends."
The Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that while Congress may measure an excise as
it will, still it may be held that the excise must be computed with some relation to the prop-
erty disposed of. That is, it may not be reckoned by a graduated scale upon an amount
which included the grantor's estate as well. It would seem, therefore, that the Circuit Court
of Appeals in effect adopted the argument of the government in White v. Erskine supra
note 71, that § 3o2 (d) of the Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 7o (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1o94 (d)
(1928), imposed a new form of excise tax. However, neither that case nor' Brady v. Ham,
supra note 69, was mentioned by the Circuit Court of Appeals. See also Meyer v. Bank of
Manhattan Trust Co., 232 App. Div. 228, 249 N. Y. Supp. 64o (I93I) ; Faulkner v. Irving
Trust Co., 231 App. Div. 87, 246 N. Y. Supp. 313 (930).
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or in trust for the benefit of others. So far as concerns the tax here
involved, there is no difference in principle between a transfer subject
to such changes and one that is revocable." 76
The Supreme Court stated that the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, which it affirmed, was in conflict with that in Brady v. Ham,77 and
Cover v. Burnet.78 It would seem, therefore, that these decisions were
thereby overruled. And it is believed that White v. Erskine, supra, was also
overruled, since the Court stated that the construction that subdivision (a) of
Section 302 is a limitation upon subdivision (d), as there held, cannot be
sustained. The Court further stated that "subdivision (d) requires to be
included in the calculation all property previously transferred by decedent,
the enjoyment of which remains at the time of his death subject to any
change by the exercise of a power by himself alone or in conjunction with
another."
The Circuit Court of Appeals admitted that if the deed had antedated
the statute and there had been a complementary gift tax in the Act of 1926
(as there is in the Act of 1932), appropriately worded, so as to make the
revocation of such a power taxable as a gift, difficulties would have arisen,
since the donee could not escape, either by revoking the power or leaving it
unexercised until his death. On this aspect of the case, Circuit Judge Learned
Hand said:
". . .the testator by relinquishing the power could have freed his
estate altogether; he had ample season for this, for he did not die until
some eight months after the statute was passed. This seems to us to
avoid any possible constitutional difficulties. If the power be regarded
as the testator's property in a beneficial sense,-a hypothesis we reject,-
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. rules; if it be regarded as limited to a
change of beneficiaries from which he could not indirectly profit, he
might abandon it and avoid the tax. Surely there is no such hardship
in the alternative as would justify holding that the inclusion of the estate
in the base for computations denied him 'due process of law'." "
Thus, the net estate, upon the transfer of which the federal estate tax
is imposed, is not limited to property which passes from the decedent at his
death. The decedent may have deprived himself of all estate or interest in
the property, but if his death terminates the "possibility of any change by
him", either alone or in conjunction with any person, and is, "in respect of
title to the property in question, the source of valuable assurance passing
from the dead to the living" the transfer is taxable. The fact that the
70 53 Sup. Ct. at 453.
71 Supra note 48. See text supra 953.
Supra note 73.
6o F. (2d) at 674.
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decedent held no estate or interest in the property or the beneficial enjoyment
thereof is not necessarily conclusive.
It should be noted that the phrase, "either by the decedent alone or in
conjunction with any person" in Section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1932,
respecting the power of a grantor to alter, amend or revoke a trust, is differ-
ent from the language employed in Section i66 of the Act where the addi-
tional words "not having a substantial adverse interest" are included.80 The
difference may be of importance.
Finally in Dexter v. Treasurer and Receiver General 8 by the deed of
trust the grantor divested himself of all his title to the trust estate. He
reserved the power to appoint other persons than those named as beneficiaries,
but it was expressly stipulated that the grantor could not re-vest the trust
property in himself or any beneficial interest therein. The death of the
grantor did not measure the duration of the trust. The transfer was held not
to come within the meaning of the state statute, as property passing by deed
made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of
the grantor.
F. In the sixth class, the grantor reserves less by a general power of
appointment than by a power of revocation. However, having reserved the
income for his life and the right to dispose of the remainder by will, the
non-exercise of the power is analogous to a testamentary disposition in
accordance with the original provisions of the trust deed.82  That is to say,
a power of appointment is considered the equivalent of a power of revocation
for purposes of the tax. Reservation of the beneficial interest during life
and a power of appointment by will is little less than ownership. 3
I In this connection, compare the following extract from Smr. REP. No. 665, mupra note
38, at 34:
"Revocable Trusts. Under the present law the income of a trust is taxable to the grantor
where, at any time during the taxable year, the grantor has power to revest in himself title
to any part of the; corpus of the trust, either alone or in Iconjunction with any person not a
beneficiary of the trust. In an attempt to avoid this section, the practice has been adopted
by some grantors of reserving power to revest title to the trust corpus in conjunction with
a beneficiary having a very minor interest or of conferring the power to revest upon a person
other than a beneficiary; in such cases the grantor has substantially the same control as if he
alone had power to revoke the trust. While it is, of course, yet to be established that such
device accomplishes its purpose, it is considered expedient to make it clear that in any of
these cases the income shall be taxed to the grantor. The House bill made the grantor of a
trust taxable upon the income of any part of the corpus of the trust, where the power to re-
vest in the grantor title to such part of the corpus was in the grantor alone or was in the
grantor in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the dis-
position of such part of the corpus. Your committee has extended the scope of this provision
so as to include, as well, the cases where the power to revest title to any part of the corpus is
held, either alone or in conjunction with the grantor, by a person not having a substantial
adverse interest in such part of the corpus or in the income therefrom."
See Corliss v. Bowers, and Stetson v. Commissioner, both mipra note 28. See also the
portion of the report quoted supra note 38, and the New York cases cited supra note 75.
'Sitpra note 45.
'Darnall v. Connor, 161 Md. 21o, 155 Atl. 894 (1931), (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 3oi;
Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 26; Smith v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. ist,
1932), rezeg 23 B. T. A. 631 (1931) ; Bromley v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 878 (1932);
Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (193o) 4 Thuyv. L. Rv. 52i, 535.
'New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Livingston, 133 N. Y. 125, 128, 3o N. E. 724
(Sw).
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But in United States v. Field 8 4 the decedent died leaving a trust, the
income of which was to be paid to his wife during her life, and after her
death to such persons as she should by will appoint. She died leaving a will
appointing the income to her children. The commissioner included in the
gross estate of the wife the property covered by the power of appointment.
The Supreme Court held that Section 202 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1916
had no provisions which applied to the exercise of a power of appointment
by a decedent respecting property not her own.
The federal statute 85 and some state statutes 86 expressly tax the exer-
cise of a general power of appointment. Under the federal estate tax statute,
a power may be general, although it may be exercised only by will.
8 7
In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn 88 it was held that
where the persons or classes who may be appointed are otherwise unlimited,
the fact that the donee cannot exercise it for his own benefit, does not prevent
it from being a general power; and a general power of appointment was not
to be deemed special, because property passing under it could not under the
law of the state be subjected in equity to the claims of the donee's creditors.
On the other hand, a power which the donee cannot exercise in favor of his
creditors is not deemed to be a general one.8 9 The distinction has been
pointed out by Circuit Judge Parker in the following language:
Nothing passes or is transferred from the estate of the
donee in the case of a naked or special power of appointment, and Con-
gress has recognized this fact by not requiring that property passing
under a special power be included in the estate. It is, only property sub-
ject to a general power-property of which the donee might have
obtained the benefit by subjecting it to the payment of his debts-which
is required to be included." 0
s Supra note 27.
SSec. 3o2 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 279 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § lO94
(f) (Supp. 1932).
"I Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note IO; Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 26; Matter
of Wendell, 223 N. Y. 433, 19ig N. E. 879 (1918) ; Orr v. Gillman, 183 U. S. 278, 22 Sup.
Ct. 213 (i9Ol), aff'g Matter of Dows, 167 N. Y. 227, 6o N. E. 439 (igoi) ; Chanler v.
Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550 (19o7), afg' Matter of Delano, 176 N. Y. 486, 68
N. E. 781 (1903); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct.
2o2 (1926), (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 716, (1927) 25 Micir. L. REv. 786; Brandies v. Cochrane,
supra note 63, at 351. See also Simes, The Devolution. of Title to Appointed Property
(1928) 22 ILT. L. REv. 480, 5o8.
" Minis v. United States, 66 Court Cl. 58, certiorari denied 278 U. S. 657, 49 Sup. Ct.
185 (x929) ; Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, i927) ; Blackburne
v. Brown, 43 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o); (193o) 30 Con. L. REv. 418; cf. Fidelity
Trust Co. v. McCaughn, i F. (2d) 987, 988 (E. D. Pa. 1924); Bishop v. Commissioner,
23 B. T. A. 920, 928 (1931). Reference has been made to the distinction between general
and limited powers of appointment. Supra note 63. See also Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Bowers, supra note 26. See text supra 951.
34 F. (2d) 6oo (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
'Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
Id. at 76o.
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Finally, in Stratton v. United States " the life tenant had power of
appointment by will. There was a gift over in default of such appointment.
Under the local law her exercise of the power subjected the property to her
debts. Consequently, the property embraced within the power was included
in the gross estate of the donee. It would seem, therefore, that the law of
the state respecting powers is a controlling element.
92
G. A trust deed may provide that if the beneficiary of the income for
life, with remainder to his issue, should die without leaving any issue, the
trust shall terminate and the corpus revert to the grantor. It is not an
impossible contingency that during the lifetime of the grantor he might re-
ceive back the property. Here the question is whether there was an absolute
transfer, or whether it is contingent until the death of the grantor. A brief
consideration of several cases will illustrate the importance of ascertaining
the exact nature of the interest of the grantor in this particular.
In the case of a grant upon condition subsequent, the grantee takes-
not title in fee simple absolute-but only a base or determinable fee. How-
ever, nothing remains in the grantor or his heirs except the right to take
advantage of a breach of the condition-a mere possibility of reverter, which
is neither an estate nor an interest in property, nor an assignable nor a devis-
able chose in action, nor a possibility coupled with an interest, but a bare
possibility alone.9 3 A possibility of reverter in the grantor is similar to,
though not quite identical with, the possibility of reverter which remains in
the grantor upon a condition subsequent.9 4  A mere expectancy is not
property.95
'15o F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. ist, i93i), certiorari denied 284 U. S. 65i, 52 Sup. Ct. 3'
(1932).
1 Cf. Leser v. Burnet, supra note 89; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 501, 50
Sup. Ct. 356, 358 (1930) ; Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484, 489, 496, 2o Sup. Ct. 404, 4o6,
4o9 (igoo) ; Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400, 404, 31 Sup. Ct. 79, 8o (igio). However, in
Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 75, at 452, it is stated: "The Act, § 301 (a), imposes a
tax 'upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent.' The net estate as there used
does not mean an amount to be ascertained as such under any general rule of law or under
statutes governing the administration of estates, but is the gross estate as specifically defined
in § 3o2 less deductions permitted by § 303."
' Marvin v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 571, 576 (87) ; Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church
v. Putnam, 221 App. Div. 502, 504, 224 N. Y. Supp. 651, 654 (1927) ; Nicholl v. New York
& Erie R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121, 132 (1854) ; Fowler v. Coates, 2o N. Y. 257, 263, 94 N. E.
997, 998 (1911) ; Matter of Terry, 218 N. Y. 218, X12 N. E. 931 (1916) ; Southwick v. New
York Christian Missionary Soc., i5i App. Div. 116, 135 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1912); North v.
Graham, 235 Ill. i78, 18I, 85 N. E. 267, 269 (igo8) ; Presbyterian Church v. Venable, I59
Ill. 215, 218, 42 N. E. 836, 837 (i896) ; Institution for Savings v. Home for Aged Women,
244 Mass. 583, 587, 139 N. E. 301, 303 (i923); Puffer v. Clark, 2o2 Mich. 169, i99, i68
N. W. 471, 480 (1918) ; Pond v. Douglas, io6 Me. 85, 89, 75 Atl. 320, 322 (igog) ; Lyford
v. Laconia, 75 N. H. 220, 225, 72 Atl. io85, io89 (igog) ; Powell, Determinable Fees (1923)
23 CoL L. REV. 207, 222-231; Note (924) 3o A. L. R. 478.
" First Universalist Society v. Boland, i55 Mass. 170, 175, 29 N. E. 524, 525 (892).
'In re Ellenborough, [1903] 1 Ch. 697, 701. In New York where the grantor reserves
the reversion in the event of the beneficiary leaving no issue, the grantor has an estate in
expectancy, which is descendible, devisable and alienable in the same manner as an estate in
possession. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cary, i91 N. Y. 33, 39, 83 N. E. 598, 6oo
(igoS).
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In Klein v. United States "I the grantor conveyed a life estate, which
was to become a fee "in the event that said grantee shall survive the said
grantor". Since the vesting of the fee in the grantee was dependent upon the
happening of the condition precedent, the transfer was postponed to take
effect in possession and enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. And
in Sargent v. White 97 the grantor transferred property to trustees with
directions to pay the income to himself, or to accumulate the whole or any
part and add it to the corpus. If the grantor survived his wife, the trust
estate was to be paid over to him. If the wife survived, then the trustees
on the donor's death were to pay over the corpus to the wife. The grantor
predeceased the wife and the transfer was held taxable as one taking effect
in possession or enjoyment upon the grantor's death, since the grantor had,
in effect, conveyed the trust funds to the trustees to hold during his life, with
contingent remainders in himself and his wife. Circuit Judge Wilson, in
delivering the opinion of the court, said:
It was clearly the intent of the decedent that the trust funds
should not become absolutely vested during his life, or, in the words of
the statute, that the remainder after the life estate in the trustees should
not 'take effect in possession or enjoyment' in his wife until his death.
Upon his death and as a result, the entire trust funds then passed to his
wife. See Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231, 75 L. Ed. 996, which
differs from this case to this extent-that the grantor by deed transferred
a life estate in some real estate directly to his wife, expressly reserving
in himself the fee, which, or, as in this case the absolute title to the trust
funds, passed to the wife in case she survived him." OS
And in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner 9 9 property was
transferred by a deed to a trustee to pay the income therefrom to the grantor's
estranged wife until her death, or prior termination of the trust, and then to
convey the principal to the grantor, if then living, or, if not, then to his
children. Upon certain contingencies, the grantor might revoke the trust
with the consent of his wife. The grantor died before the wife, with the
trust still in force. The transfer of the remainder interest to the children
was held to be one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death. Mr. Murdock, a member of the Board of Tax Appeals,
said:
The transfer of the remainder to the children was one
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
grantor's death. It was contingent upon his dying before the trust ter-
minated. It vested in the children at his death. His death was the
indispensable and intended event which effected the transmission of the
'283 U. S. 231, 5I Sup. Ct. 398 (1931).
0'5o F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. Ist, 193). See also Union Trust Co. v. United States, 73
Court. C1. 35, 54 F. (2d) 153 (i93I).
:5o F. (2d) at 411.
25 B. T. A. "153 (1932).
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remainder from the dead (the husband) to the living (the children).
The transfer of the remainder was not a sale for a full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth. The grantor could not sell
to himself, and there was no consideration in money or money's worth
for the transfer to the children." 100
The reverse situation was presented in Peabody v. Commissioner,"1
where the grantor conveyed full title with provision for reversion to herself
in case she survived t#¢o grandchildren. The transfer of the property subject
to defeasance upon the happening of the condition subsequent was held non-
taxable. The distinction between a disposition to take effect upon the death
of the grantor and one to take effect immediately but subject to be revoked
by the grantor is important.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duke 10 2 the grantor executed
two trust instruments by which he conveyed to himself, as trustee, for the
benefit of his daughter and her descendants, certain personal property. The
grantor also appointed successor trustees, who accepted the trusts. The
grantor did not reserve the power to revoke. The trust properties were to
revert to the grantor in the event the daughter died during his lifetime. The
daughter survived the grantor, and upon his death the successor trustees took
possession of the corpus and administered the trusts in accordance with their
terms, without any other change by reason of the death of the grantor.
The Board held that the decedent had divested himself fully and irrevocably
of all interest in the trust property, that no interest therein remained to be
transferred as an incident of his death, and that there was no basis for the
federal estate tax. Mr. Trammell delivered the opinion, saying:
" . . The fact that there was a bare possibility that the property
which had already passed to the trust for the beneficiary might revert
to the grantor during his lifetime, not by any act on his part, does not
have the effect of reserving to the grantor any rights or benefits which
passed at or after his death. He might have, by a bare possibility,
reacquired the property during his life, but he did not." 103
The fact that the grantor constituted himself trustee is immaterial, 104 since
he did not retain control over the economic benefits or enjoyment of the trust
estate during the continuance of the trust in his lifetime. In the McCormick
case 105 the trust properties reverted to the grantor if she survived the bene-
ficiaries, and the transfer was held non-taxable.
m Id. at 1156.
=24 B. T. A. 787 (1931). To the same effect, see Dunham v. Commissioner, 26 B. T.
A. 286, 291 (1932). See Scott, supra note 82, at 528.
'm23 B. T. A. i1o4 (1931), aff'd 62 F. (2d) 1057 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) certiorari granted,
U. S. Daily L. J., May 9, 1933, at 217. Cf. Klein v. United States, s=pra note 96.
1Id. at II12,
10 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2; Erickson v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A.
831 (1932). See also Wheeler v. Commissioner, 2o B. T. A. 695 (1930).
3Supra note 36. Cf. Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 188 C. C. A. 2d, 1932),
rev'd 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (933), (1933) 8I U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 776.
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Under the New York transfer tax statute it was held 10 that the mere
existence of a possibility of reversion, whether expressly reserved or implied
from the incompleteness of the limitations, did not render a transfer taxable.
It will be recalled that the New York transfer tax, like the federal estate tax,
is on the right to transmit. 10 7 In Matter of Barstow 108 the grantor con-
veyed property in trust to be held by the trustee during the lives of her two
daughters. The grantor reserved the income for her life and upon her death
one-half of the income was to be paid to one daughter and the other half to
the other daughter. The trust instrument further provided that the trust
property should revert to the grantor should both daughters die before she
did. No power of revocation was reserved. It was held that the reservation
by the grantor of the possibility of reversion did not prevent the transfer
from taking effect when the deed of trust was executed. The court said:
Mrs. Barstow could do nothing to change the effect of the
deed. The corpus was beyond her control, except for the happening of
the contingency that she might survive the two life tenants, and then
she would have been revested with the corpus. The rights of the bene-
ficiaries did not depend upon the death of the donor. The teri of the
trust was not measured by the life of the donor, but by the lives of her
two daughters. They had an interest in principal and income, provided
one or both survived the donor. They took a vested estate subject to
being divested if the donor survived both daughters. If we 'are to view
the sequence of events in the order of the actual rather than the pos-
sible' (Matter of Schmidlapp, 236 N. Y. 278, 286), then we have not
only a right but are bound to conclude that because Mrs. Barslow died
before the termination of the trust which she created, the transfer took
place when the deed was executed, and not when she died. There was
the contingency that she might survive her daughters, but that did not
depend upon any affirmative or volitional act of the donor." 19
It would seem, therefore, that the mere right of a grantor to have the
trust property transferred to him upon the happening of a remote contingency
over which he has no control-such as the death of a cestui que trust prior
to the death of the grantor-is not an interest in property and such a possibil-
ity of reversion does not render the transfer taxable, especially when the con-
tingency never happened. 10 Obviously, if the corpus of the trust fund re-
'Matter of Kirby, 133 Misc. 152, 231 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1928), aff'd 228 App. Div. 64o,
239 N. Y. Supp. 39o (1930), aff'd without opinion 254 N. Y. 624, 173 N. E. 894 (1930) ;
Matter of Barstow, 23a App. Div. 371, 244 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1930), aff'd without opinion
256 N. Y. 647, 177 N. E. 177 (1931) ; Matter of Schweinert, 133 Misc. 762, 234 N. Y. Supp.
3o7 (1929), (1929) 43 H&,v. L. Rav. 143; In re Bowers' Estate, 195 App. Div. 548, 553, 186
N. Y. Supp. 912, 915, aff'd 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 9IO (i921). See, however, In re
Dunlap's Estate, 2o5 App. Div. 128, igg N. Y. Supp. 147 (1923).
10TSupra note ii.
2''Supra note io6.
' 230 App. Div. at 372, 244 N. Y. Supp. at 589.
20 Cf. Guggenheim v. Commissioner, supra note O5.
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verts to the grantor during his lifetime, it will be taxable at his death, if still
in his possession.
Ever since the enactment of the estate tax law in 1916, Congress has
sought to prevent the avoidance of the tax by including in the gross taxable
estate of the decedent all transfers or trusts made in contemplation of, or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. Appar-
ently the statute was considered all inclusive."' But the recurrent contest
between the government and the taxpayer over the collection of this "onerous
incidence" of ownership 112 showed the necessity of further legislation if all
gaps were to be closed. The first step was the inclusion of the exercise of a
general power of appointment 113 and certain insurance policies by the Rev-
enue Act of 1918.114 The trust device presented possibilities of avoiding the
estate tax; the aim of the trust device being to transfer property, in some
instances, without surrendering control and enjoyment or its use during the
life of the grantor.'-" But there have been gradual restrictions on the trust
device. Mention has been made of the amendment -" of March 3, 1931,
designed to include in the gross estate all transfers reserving an interest for
the life of the grantor, which was inspired by the three per curiam opin-
ions 117 following May v. Heiner. Such restrictions culminated in the
Revenue Act of 1932, imposing a gift tax.118 While the federal estate tax
is not a gift tax," 9 nevertheless a transfer by gift may be subject to both the
gift tax and the estate tax. Accordingly, Congress has provided for a credit
of the former against the latter.12 0  The conclusive or irrebuttable presump-
tion in the Act of 1926 that transfers made within two years of death were
deemed to be in contemplation thereof having been held unconstitutional,
121
was omitted from the Act of 1932.
' United States v. Field, supra note 27, at 261, 41 Sup. Ct. at 257.
'Clark, J., in Clapp v. Heiner, 5I F. (2d) 224, 225 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
' Simes, supra note 86, at 508-514. See the cases cited supra notes 88-91. Cf. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra note 86.
.&4o STAT. 1097. See Chase National Bank v. United States, supra note 2, and cases
cited. See also Oppenheimer, supra note 2. As to the taxation of insurance trusts see
Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1930)' 78 U. OF PA. L REv. 346,
373; and as to. the application of state inheritance taxes to the proceeds of war-risk insur-
ance, see (1928) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 242.
' See Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Impositiont of Federal Income and
Estate Taxes (193o) 15 CORN. L. Q. 587, 595.
" See supra note 38.
' Supra notes 33-36.
I Act of 1932, §§ 5Ol-532, 47 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § iI36a-I136gg (Supp.
1932).
The gift tax is constitutional and valid as to gifts made after its effective date.
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1929), (1926) 4o HARv, L. REv. II8,
120, (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 852. But it is invalid as to gifts made prior to its enactment.
Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353 (1928).
"0 § 301 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1932. See also, § 322 of the Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 315
(1924), 26 U. S. C. A. (1928) §1134; and §4o4 of the Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 791, 863
(I928), 26 U. S. C. A. (1928) § 1134.
Heiner v. Donnan, supra note 3; Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U. S. 352, 52
Sup. Ct. 371 (1932) ; Guinzburg v. Anderson, 54 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), certiorari
denied 285 U. S. 553, 52 Sup. Ct. 410 (1932) ; White v. Hall, 53 F. (2d) 2o (C. C. A. Ist,
1931), certiorari denied, 285 U. S. 553, 52 Sup. Ct. 410 (1932) ; American Security & Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 334 (931). See also (931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1052.
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The question remains as to what powers a grantor may retain in a trust
without rendering it subject to inheritance taxation. If the provision of the
Revenue Act of 1932 including in the gross estate all transfers where the
grantor reserves the income of the trust for his life, 122 be upheld, the federal
estate and gift taxes may be considered a well rounded system of inheritance
taxation.'
23
An appreciation of the problem may be had by a brief discussion of the
nature of the interest of the cestui que trust. A supposititious case will be
helpful. A, the owner of securities, conveys them to a trustee upon trust to
pay the income thereof to himself during his life and thereafter to W, his
wife. Upon the death of the survivor of A and W, the trustee shall dis-
tribute the trust estate equally among the children of A and W; there being
two children living at the date of execution of the trust instrument. It is
obvious that upon the delivery of the trust instrument an interest in remainder
vests in the children, subject to opening up to admit subsequently born chil-
dren. The children have an expectancy. What is the nature of the interest
of A under the trust? Is it property,
124 or merely the right to enforce 125
the performance of the trust in equity?
Under the law of New York, a beneficiary during life of the income of
a trust fund has no property interest in the income arising from the securities
See supra note 38.
See Comment (1929) 38 YA L. J. 657; Note (1932) 45 H~nv. L. REv. I56;
Amberg, Retroactive Excise Taxation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 691; Coolidge v. Long,
supra note I. Nichols v. Coolidge, supra note 8; Untermyer v. Anderson, supra note 11;
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105 (1927); Reinecke v. Smith, supra
note 28.
"'See Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. REv.
269; Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589, 598, 35 Sup. Ct. 154, 157 (1915) ; Maguire v. Trefry,
253 U. S. 12, 16, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 418 (1920), aff'g 230 Mass. 5o3,'.I2o N. E. 162 (igi);
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280
U. S. 83, 96, 5o Sup. Ct. 59, 62 (1929) ; Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 291, 43 N. E. 1O3,
lO4 (1896); McCeney v. Prince George's County, 153 Md. 25, 137 Atl. 291 (1927);
Brandies v. Cochrane, supra note 63, at 351, 5 Sup. Ct. at 197; 3 POMEROY, EUIY JuIs-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1gig) § 975; 39 Cyc. 228.
-' See Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 CoL. L.
REV. 467. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Virginia, supra note 124 at 95, 96, 50 Sup. Ct. at 61, 62; (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 539, 544;
(1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 668; (193o) 28 MICHr. L. REV. 776; Melenky v. Melen, 233 N. Y.
19, 22, 134 N. E. 822 (1922); Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 321, 50 N. E. 967, 968
(1898) ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 376 (1882) ; Bennett v. Garlock, 79 N. Y. 3o2,
320 (i8go); Gilman v. Reddington, z4 N. Y. 9, 15-16 (1861); Coster v. Lorillard, 14
Wend. 265, 304 (N. Y. 1835); Culter v. Hardy, 48 Cal. 568 (1874) ; In re Dolan's Estate,
79 Cal. 65, 21 Pac. 545 (1889); Culbertson v. Whitbeck Co., 127 U. S. 326, 334, 8 Sup. Ct.
1136, 1140 (1888) (upon a Michigan statute).
"A cestui que trust is frequently spoken of as an equitable owner of the land. This,
though a convenient form of expression, is clearly inaccurate. The trustee is the owner of
the land, and, of course, two persons with adverse interests cannot be owners of the same
thing. What the cestui que trust really owns is the obligation of the trustee; * * *." Ames,
Purchaser for Value Without Notice (1887) I HAv. L. REv. 1, 9; see also HoHrELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 24, io6; Book Review (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv.
462, 464.
In the case of an oral contract for the sale of land, the purchaser, in certain instances
in spite of the bar of the Statute of Frauds, has a right to a conveyance but is held to have
no equitable estate in the land. Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. Jr. 341 (Eng. 1802) ; Blew
v. McClelland, 29 Mo. 304 (186o) ; (1924) 22 MlCH. L. REv. 834.
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constituting the trust fund, but has only a chose in action available against
the trustee to enforce the performance of the trust in equity. The persons
for whose benefit the trust is created take no estate or interest in the corpus;
the whole estate in law and in equity being in the trustee. 12
The nature of the federal estate tax must be clearly understood. Chief
Justice Taft described its precise nature by saying:
". .. What was being imposed here was an excise upon the
transfer of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax upon
succession and receipt of benefits under the law or the will. It was death
duties as distinguished from a legacy or succession tax. What this law
taxes is not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on
death, but the interest which ceased by reason of death." 127
The only section 128 imposing the tax, Section 301, is on the transfer of
"the net estate of every decedent." As a general proposition if there is no
property or beneficial interest in property passing from the decedent at death,
there can be no federal estate tax. 2 ' The real question in our supposititious
case is, whether the remainders which the children take under the trust instru-
'Archer-Shee v. Garland, [I93i] A. C. 212; People ex rel. Brooklyn Trust Co. v.
Loughman, 226 App. Div. 41, 234 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1929), aff'd without opinion sub noam.
People ex rel. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lynch, 251 N. Y. 569, I68 N. E. 430 (1929). See also
the New York cases cited supra note 125.
1Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, supra note 9, at 50, 44 Sup. Ct. at 292. See also cases cited
supra notes 13-15.
In Crooks v. Loose, 36 F. (2d) 571, 573 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) Circuit Judge Booth said,
"The federal estate tax law is not concerned primarily with the character of the interest or
estate acquired by the beneficiary, or its subsequent status; but the law is primarily concerned
with the ceasing of the interest of the decedent in the property, with the 'shifting of economic
benefits' of property from the decedent. If there is such a ceasing of the interest of the
decedent, such a 'shifting of economic benefits', the federal estate tax comes into play."
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2, at 348, 49 Sup. Ct. at 126. See also
White v. Erskine, supra note 71, at ioi6, where Circuit Judge Wilson said, "In sec. 3o2
(a) it is expressly limited to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of
his death. This limitation in view of the nature of the tax, viz. a tax on the right to transfer
property at death, must, in view of the opening words of each subdivision, be applied through-
out the section. In other words, if there be no property or beneficial interest in property
passing from the decedent at death, there can be no tax under this act."
However, in Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 75, at 453, it is stated, "And peti-
tioners assume, as held in White v. Erskine, 47 F. (2d) 1014, that (a) is a limitation upon
(d) and argue that the gross estate includes property only to the extent of the 'interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death' and that, as before his death he had
divested himself of all title, the property so transferred is not to be included in the gross
estate. But the construction thus taken for granted cannot be sustained. Subdivision (a)
does not in any way refer to or purport to modify (d) and, in view of the familiar rule that
tax laws are to be construed liberally in favor of taxpayers, it cannot be said that, if it
stood alone, (a) would extend to the transfers brought into the gross estate by (d). United
States v. Field, supra, 264. Moreover, Congress has progressively expanded the bases for
such taxation. Comparison of § 302 with corresponding provisions of earlier Acts warrants
the conclusion that (d) is not a mere specification of something covered by (a) but that it
covers something not included therein. Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278
U. S. 327; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497; Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224;
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 287 U. S. ."
'New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506 (ig21) ; Edwards v.
Slocum; Nichols v. Coolidge, both supra note 8; Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, supra note 9; May v.
Heiner; Chase National Bank v. United States; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., all supra
note 2; Frew v. Bowers, supra note 3; McCaughn v. Carnill, supra note 30; Brady v. Ham,
supra note 69; White v. Erskine, supra note 71; Leser v. Burnet, supra note 89.
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ment were "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after" the
death of A. Until his death, it may be argued, they have no actual possession,
or right to the possession of the property. Since the children cannot receive
any part of the principal or the income until after A's death, it may be con-
tended, their right of enjoyment is postponed until the happening of that
event, and that whatever interest they may have had before, the right to the
possession and enjoyment depends upon the death of A, the grantor. In
other words, the argument is that the death of the grantor is the event which
makes the transfer complete and effective and secures to the children and W,
the wife, the possession and enjoyment of the property.
In order to answer these questions, reference should be made to the
extract from Coolidge v. Long."3O In addition, it should be observed that
the statute draws a distinction between the passing of the right of succession
and the subsequent enjoyment, 131 or termination of a defeasible quality. The
federal estate tax is imposed upon "the transfer of an estate upon the death
of the owner", 32 but it may not be imposed when in advance thereof the
vested expectant estate has passed from the grantor. Finally, if there be no
property or beneficial interest in property passing from A upon his death,
there can be no federal estate tax.
Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1932 is explicit, and the intent
of Congress thereby to impose the tax is undoubted.'3 If the interest of A
is regarded as merely a personal claim against the trustee-a chose in action,
the interest he possessed immediately prior to his death was "obliterated" by
that event ' 3 4 and nothing passes from the dead to the living. Consequently
there can be no federal estate tax upon the transfer by A in the assumed case,
since the transfer was made and title to the corpus of the fund was definitely
fixed by the trust deed. If, on the other hand, the interest of the cestui que
trust is regarded as an interest in the trust property,
135 and not merely as a
personal claim against the trustee, the tax may be upheld.
As yet there is no explicit holding by the Supreme Court that beneficial
interest is, in general, the test of taxability.
36 It is doubtful what the
Supreme Court will ultimately hold on the question whether a person may
am Supra note 54. See text supra 949.
Cf. Shukert v. Allen, supra note 49; McCaughn v. Carnill; Hodgkins v. Commis-
sioner, both supra note 30; Curley v. Tait, supra note 6o.
-2 May v. Heiner, supra note 2, at 244, So Sup. Ct. at 287; Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, supra
note 9; Nichols v. Coolidge, supra note 8, at 537, 47 Sup. Ct. at 771.
=m See SmT. REP. No. 665, supra note 38.
May v. Heiner, supra note 2, at 243, 50 Sup. Ct. at 286.
""The question as to the interest of the cestui que trust may be determined by the law
of the particular state where the transfer occurs. Cf. Tyler v. United States, supra note 
92,
at 501, 50 Sup. Ct. at 538; Warburton v. White, supra note 92, at 496, 20 Sup. 
Ct. at 409;
De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 570, 17 Sup. Ct. 461, 
462 (1897); Leser
v. Burnet, supra note 89, at 760; Whitelock-Rose v. McCaughn, supra note 87, at 
165. Cf.,
however, Blackburne v. Brown, supra note 87, at 322. Compare, however, Saltonstall 
v.
Saltonstall, supra note io at 271, 48 Sup. Ct. at 227 (where a succession tax was 
being
considered).
=" Cf., however, Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 75.
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make an absolute transfer of his property and require the net income, or a
portion thereof, to be paid to himself during his life without subjecting it to
the tax, notwithstanding the language of the present statute. The question
is whether the death of A "has brought into being or ripened for the survivor,
property rights of such character as to make appropriate the imposition of a
tax upon that result".' 37  In this connection the following language of Mr.
Justice Sutherland seems pertinent:
If the event is death and the result which is made the occa-
sion of the tax is the bringing into being or the enlargement of property
rights, and Congress chooses to treat the tax imposed upon that result
as a death duty, even though, strictly, in the absence of an expression
of the legislative will, it might not thus be denominated, there is nothing
in the Constitution which stands in the way." 138
It will be noted that it is "the bringing into being or the enlargement of
property rights" which may be made the occasion of the estate tax. But if
the rights of the remaindermen are brought into being or fixed by the deed
of trust and no property or beneficial interest in property passes from A at
his death, there is no taxable transfer within the legal meaning of the statu-
tory phrase, "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death". However, the provision may be upheld as an adjunct to the
general scheme of taxation as a means to prevent an avoidance of the estate
tax by this method of disposition during the lifetime of the grantor.
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As to what powers a grantor may reserve respecting the management
of the trust without subjecting the transfer to the tax has been the subject of
judicial consideration. We have seen '40 that the grantor may constitute
himself trustee without retaining the economic benefits or enjoyment of the
trust estate. In such an event, the grantor presumably will have full control
of the administration of the trust. On the other hand, the grantor may,
among other powers, reserve the power to supervise the changing or reinvest-
ment of the trust funds, to require the trustee to execute proxies to his nom-
inee or otherwise direct the voting of stock in the trust estate, and to appoint
successor trustees without subjecting the transfer to the tax.' 4 ' The ratio
pertinens has been expressed by Mr. Justice Stone:
.. . Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts
save to decedent any control over the economic benefits or the enjoyment
of the property. He would equally have reserved all these powers and
others had he made himself the trustee, but the transfer would not for
Cf. Tyler v. United States, supra note 92, at 503, 50 Sup. Ct. at 539.
Id. at 502, 5o Sup. Ct. at 538.
Compare Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470, 482, 49 Sup. Ct. 199, 201 (1929).
"0 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., su-pra note 2, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125; Commis-
sioner v. Duke, supra note lO2; Wheeler v. Commissioner, supra note 1O4.
11 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2, see text supra 953 ; McCormick v. Bur-
net, supra note 30, see text supra 944; Commissioner v. Duke, supra note 1O2. Cf. Brady v.
Ham, supra note 48, see text supra 953.
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that reason have been incomplete. The shifting of the economic interest
in the trust property which was the subject of the tax was thus complete
as soon as the trust was made. His power to recall the property and of
control over it for his own benefit then ceased and as the trusts were not
made in contemplation of death, the reserved powers do not serve to
distinguish them from any other gift inter vivos not subject to the
tax." 142
If the reservation by the grantor does not affect in any substantial
degree "the economic benefits or the enjoyment of the property" or his death
end the possibility of any change by his exercise or non-exercise of a power
with respect to the disposition of the principal and income, it may be disre-
garded for purposes of the federal estate tax.
Conclusions
There is a decided difference between transfer and succession taxes.
Cases arising under the former may not be, and in many instances are not,
dispositive of a similar issue upon the latter. Indeed the transfer under the
same deed of trust may be non-taxable in so far as the federal estate tax is
concerned and yet taxable in so far as a state succession tax is concerned.
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Conversely, a transfer may be held subject to the federal estate tax as a
transfer intended to take effect at or after death and not be subject to the
state tax.
144
Congress did not intend to limit the estate tax to transfers of title at
death. The object of Congress, in the federal estate tax statute is to impose
an excise tax not only measured by the value of the property actually owned
by the decedent at his death, i. e., his net estate at death; 145 but also based
upon the value of property the subject of transactions which accomplish the
same results, i. e., transactions which are in effect testamentary in character
although the title has passed from the decedent prior to his death. In other
words, to prevent tax avoidance, Congress seeks to impose the tax whenever
there is a transfer, regardless of its form, which in substance is testamentary
in character; i. e., whenever there is a gift or transfer consummated by the
death of the donor or transferor.
In the second category, Congress has included (a) property passing
under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent; (b) pro-
21 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 2, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125.
11 Hill v. Nichols, supra note 26; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note io; Burnet V.
Northern Trust Co., supra note 30; People v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 29; McCormick
v. Burnet, supra note 30; People v. McCormick, supra note II.
"" Home Trust Co. v. Edwards, supra note 46; Matter of Carnegie. supra note 45; Mc-
Caughn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 34 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) ; In re Dolan's Estate,
supra note ii. On the other hand, the transfer may be subject to both federal and state
taxes. Matter of Schmidlapp, supra note ii; United States v. Stark, supra note 26. And
the transfer may not be subject to either. Nichols v. Coolidge, supra note 8; Coolidge v.
Long, supra note 2 (because retroactively applied and hence unconstitutional).
' Greiner v. Lewellyn, supra note 15.
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ceeds of insurance policies 146 taken out by the decedent upon his own life;
(c) property held as tenants by the entirety 147 and as joint tenants;
14
1
(d) transfers in contemplation of death or powers of revocation released in
contemplation of death; (e) transfers intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after the decedent's death; and (f) transfers rendered
absolute and complete by the death of the decedent, which before were not
complete on account of a power of revocation being reserved by the decedent.
In none of the foregoing six situations does the item or asset constitute a part
of the decedent's estate. Nor is there a transfer of title from the decedent
at his death. However, in each case the transaction is testamentary in char-
acter or accomplishes the same result that a testamentary disposition would
accomplish.
Excluded as a basis for the estate tax are (a) transfers made for a
consideration, 149 (b) transfers made by an outright gift not in contemplation
of death; and (c) transfers by way of gift not in contemplation of death
which are absolute and the decedent up to the time of his death has no interest
in the property or power of control over or to direct the course of distribution
of the property by his action or non-action.
Extensions df inheritance tax laws to include transfers not taking effect
at the death of the grantor have been designed to prevent circumvention. To
include property passing by virtue of inter vivos transfers, or in the exercise
of a power of appointment or the non-exercise of a power of revocation, in
the estate of the decedent for tax purposes cannot be justified unless the testa-
mentary character of such a transfer brings it within the reason supporting
the tax. Death must be the generating source of the transfer of the use and
enjoyment of the property. If a disposition accomplish substantially the
same result as would be accomplished by testacy or intestacy, the tax seems
permissible; but not otherwise.
"'See supra note 114.
'Tyler v. United States, supra note 92. See also, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Fletcher Savirgs & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 5o (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Third National Bank
v. White, 287 U. S. 577, 53 Sup. Ct. 290 (1932), affg 58 F. (2d)' io85 (C. C. A. Ist, 1932),
aff'g 45 F. (2d) g (D. Mass. 1930) ; Robinson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 63 F.
(2d) 652 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933). Contra: Matter of Lyon, 233 N. Y. 208, 135 N. E. 247 (I922).
8 O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6o F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 6th,
1932) ; Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224, 53 Sup. Ct. 157 (1932).
' Hirsh v. United States, 68 Court Cl. 5o8, 35 F. (2d) 982 (1929).
